Autobiographical Memory Specificity and Emotional Disorder by Williams, J. Mark G. et al.
Autobiographical Memory Specificity and Emotional Disorder
J. Mark G. Williams, Thorsten Barnhofer, and
Catherine Crane
University of Oxford
Dirk Hermans and Filip Raes
University of Leuven
Ed Watkins
University of Exeter
Tim Dalgleish
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
The authors review research showing that when recalling autobiographical events, many emotionally
disturbed patients summarize categories of events rather than retrieving a single episode. The mecha-
nisms underlying such overgeneral memory are examined, with a focus on M. A. Conway and C. W.
Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) hierarchical search model of personal event retrieval. An elaboration of this
model is proposed to account for overgeneral memory, focusing on how memory search can be affected
by (a) capture and rumination processes, when mnemonic information used in retrieval activates
ruminative thinking; (b) functional avoidance, when episodic material threatens to cause affective
disturbance; and (c) impairment in executive capacity and control that limits an individual’s ability to
remain focused on retrieval in the face of distraction.
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Autobiographical memory is the aspect of memory that is con-
cerned with the recollection of personally experienced past events.
It is central to human functioning, contributing to an individual’s
sense of self, to his or her ability to remain oriented in the world
and to pursue goals effectively in the light of past problem solving.
Such orientation and goal pursuit is particularly important for
interpersonal goals, where autobiographical memory arises from
and then, in turn, contributes to a shared social world (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
Autobiographical memory has been investigated in many dif-
ferent contexts. Research has examined its nature and function
(Pillemer, 1998; Rubin, 1996; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997);
social factors in its early development (e.g., Nelson & Fivush,
2004; Reese, 2002); the processes that underlie how events are
encoded, retrieved, and forgotten (Castel & Craik, 2003; Hertel &
Gerstle, 2003; Lancaster & Barsalou, 1997; Schacter & Slotnick,
2004; Tulving, 1983, 2002; Tulving et al., 1994); its role in
organizing one’s sense of self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Fivush & Nelson, 2004); and the aspects that are affected by
neurological damage (e.g., Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Conway &
Fthenaki, 2000; Rugg & Wilding, 2000). The focus of this article
is on one feature of autobiographical memory that has been found
to be closely linked with the psychopathology of emotion: over-
generality.
This article has five aims. We first describe the phenomenon of
overgeneral memory, including the methodology that has been
used to elicit it, and explain why it has aroused interest within
psychopathology research. Second, we review the research that has
investigated overgenerality of autobiographical memory to exam-
ine how widespread the phenomenon of overgeneral memory is
within psychopathology. Third, we consider what mechanisms
may underlie the phenomenon, drawing on a recent model of
autobiographical memory by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000).
Fourth, we describe an elaboration of their model that focuses on
three interacting mechanisms (capture and rumination, functional
avoidance, and executive control) in order to account for the data
from psychopathology. Finally, we consider how this model can
point toward what future research is necessary.
The Phenomenon of Overgeneral Memory
Early research on the role of autobiographical memory in emo-
tional disorders concerned the possibility that memory might be
biased by current mood state, a bias that might contribute to the
onset or maintenance of affective disorder. Several studies used a
Galton cue-word paradigm (Galton, 1883) to demonstrate that a
mood-congruent memory bias was present both in naturally oc-
curring states of dysphoria (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975) and in
response to experimental manipulations of mood (e.g., Clark &
Teasdale, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). Under both circum-
stances, individuals in a sad mood were shown to recall negative
events relatively faster than positive events. These early studies
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zzzPsgiolePfrpdemonstrated that autobiographical memory was a tractable phe-
nomenon to study in relation to mood.
However, in extending the mood-congruent memory paradigm
to suicidal patients, Williams and Broadbent (1986) found that in
addition to being slower to respond to positive cues than controls,
the suicidal patients, in many of their responses to both positive
and negative cue words, failed to provide a specific memory.
Instead, they responded on about half of the trials with a memory
that summarized a category of similar events (e.g., “I used to walk
the dog every morning”). This was in marked contrast to the
responses of hospital and community controls, who were specific
on more than 80% of the occasions. The poor performance of
suicidal patients on this task could not be explained by general
deficits in cognitive processing, as participants in all three groups
performed equally well on a task of semantic memory, and the two
hospitalized groups were equivalent in semantic processing speed
(as discussed later). Rather, the findings suggested that the auto-
biographical memories of suicidal patients might differ in form as
well as in content or speed of retrieval. Although serendipitous,
this initial finding of overgeneral autobiographical memory helped
to shift the emphasis of research into autobiographical memory,
with studies beginning to focus in more detail on the degree of
specificity with which personally experienced events are recol-
lected.
Cuing Methodology
Most studies have since used a cuing methodology similar to
that used by Williams and Broadbent (1986), involving the pre-
sentation of cue words varying in emotional valence (usually
referred to as the autobiographical memory test [AMT]).
1 Partic-
ipants are asked to respond to each word with an event that the
word reminds them of. They are told that the event recalled can be
important or trivial and recent or from a long time ago, but that it
should be a specific event, something that happened at a particular
place and time and lasted for a day or less. Participants are given
an example of what is meant by specific (to the word enjoy,i t
would not be okay to say “I always enjoy a good party” because
that does not mention a particular time, but it would be okay to say
“Jane’s party last Friday”). They are given practice trials to con-
firm that they have understood the instructions. Williams and
Broadbent allowed participants 1 min for each cue to retrieve a
specific memory, and later studies allowed 30 s for each response,
with failure to respond in the allotted time scored as an omission.
Responses are coded as specific if they meet the criterion of
specifying a particular event that lasted less than one day and as
nonspecific if they do not. In some studies, different types of
nonspecific memories are distinguished. Williams and Dritschel
(1992) differentiated between memories that were nonspecific by
virtue of referring to a whole class of events, so-called categorical
memories (e.g., “all the times I’ve failed exams”), and memories
that were overgeneral because they referred to an extended period
of time, so-called extended memories (e.g., “my first semester at
university”). They showed that group differences between suicidal
patients and controls were wholly due to increased retrieval of
categorical memories, with no such differences in numbers of
extended memories. The early findings from suicidal patients have
been replicated in studies by Williams and Dritschel (1988),
Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, and Howells (1992), Williams et al.
(1996), and Pollock and Williams (2001). However, the majority
of studies have looked at whether overgeneral memory occurs in
other types of emotional disorder.
Overgeneral Memory in Affective Disorders
Table 1 summarizes the studies that have examined the speci-
ficity of memory in people suffering from affective disorders.
Following the early research on suicidal patients, major depressive
disorder (MDD) was the next type of emotional disorder to be
studied. In MDD, patients experience emotional changes (feelings
of extreme sadness and hopelessness), cognitive changes (low
self-esteem, guilt, memory and concentration difficulties), changes
in behavior and motivation (feeling agitated or slowed down,
reduced interest in social or recreational activities), and changes in
bodily functioning (sleep, eating, and sexual problems; loss of
energy). Major depression is generally diagnosed when a persistent
and unreactive low mood and/or an absence of positive affect are
accompanied by a range of symptoms, the number and combina-
tion needed to make a diagnosis being operationally defined (In-
ternational Classification of Diseases, World Health Organization,
1992; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Lifetime risk for major
depression is around 12% for males and 20% for females (Kessler
et al., 1994).
Table 1 shows, first, that overgeneral memory is a consistent
characteristic of patients with a diagnosis of MDD. Eleven studies
show a significant difference between depressed patients and
matched controls, yielding a mean effect size (Cohen’s d) of 1.12
(interquartile range [IQR]  0.44). Table 1 also shows that over-
general memory occurs in other types of affective disorder, such as
postnatal depression (Croll & Bryant, 2000); in currently euthymic
patients with previous episodes of MDD or bipolar disorder
2
(Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; Mackinger, Pachinger,
Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; Scott, Stanton, Garland, & Ferrier,
2000); and in samples with subclinical levels of depression (often
referred to as dysphoria to distinguish it from more severe major
depression described earlier; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997;
Moffitt, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, & Vyse, 1994; Ramponi, Bar-
1 Although most studies make use of a word-cuing task, the phenomenon
of overgeneral retrieval has been found using not only words but also
scenarios (e.g., “Recall a time when a neighbor helped you with a practical
problem”; Moore, Watts, & Williams, 1988; Williams et al., 1996), and
free recall (e.g., “Recall as many episodes from your life as you can in ten
minutes”; Winthorpe & Rabbitt, 1988). Adding activity cues (e.g., “going
to a concert”) to cue words makes no difference to the specificity of
retrieval (Williams, 1988).
2 A diagnosis of bipolar disorder is made if a patient has experienced one
or more episodes of depression and one or more episodes of mania. Manic
episodes are characterized by elevated, expansive, or irritable mood for a
period of at least 1 week, accompanied by three or more of the following
symptoms: inflated self-esteem or grandiosity; less need for sleep; in-
creased talkativeness; flight of ideas; increased distractibility; increased
engagement in goal-directed activities (socially, sexually, or at work or
school) or psychomotor agitation; and increased engagement in risky
pleasurable activities (e.g., spending sprees, sexual indiscretions, foolish
business investments). These symptoms must have caused significant im-
pairment in normal functioning for a diagnosis to be made.
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3 The overall mean effect size for
the 28 out of 30 studies in Table 1 for which sufficient data were
available to compute Cohen’s d statistic is 0.94 (IQR  0.57)—a
large effect size.
Failures to replicate overgeneral memory in currently depressed
patients are relatively rare. Kaney, Bowen-Jones, and Bentall
(1999) found no evidence of overgeneral memory in a group of
depressed patients with delusional disorders, and Iqbal, Birch-
wood, Hemsley, Jackson, and Morris’s (2004) study of postpsy-
chotic depression found no overall main effect, though there was
an effect for positive cue words. A third failure to replicate comes
from a study on seasonal affective disorder (SAD), in which
depression is experienced more in fall and winter than in spring
and summer. Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, and Kuyken (2001) com-
pared participants with SAD (in the depression phase) with control
participants and did not find a difference in memory specificity.
However, SAD differs from other forms of depression in that
patients often do not have a history of life events or chronic
difficulties, which may be an important etiological factor for
overgenerality (as addressed later).
In summary, the overwhelming majority of studies have shown
that overgeneral memory is closely associated with depression or
depressive symptoms. The phenomenon occurs whether specificity
or overgenerality is used as an outcome variable and whether
studies examine depressed or suicidal patients or dysphoric non-
clinical samples.
Overgeneral Memory and Trauma
In 1995, Kuyken and Brewin conducted one of the first studies
to examine the role of traumatic experiences in the etiology of
overgeneral memory. Comparing depressed women with and with-
out a history of childhood sexual abuse, they found those who
reported a history of abuse retrieved significantly more overgen-
eral memories than the depressed patients who did not report such
a history. These data indicated that level of overgeneral memory
might be related to experience of trauma in addition to a diagnosis
of depression. Since the study by Kuyken and Brewin, a number of
other published studies have, as their main focus, examined the
relationship between autobiographical memory specificity and re-
ports of trauma or trauma reactions. The data are summarized in
Table 2. The studies include both reports of sexual and physical
abuse, which are important but difficult to verify, and also traffic
accidents, war trauma, cancer diagnoses, and burn accidents,
which were verified. They include nonclinical samples (Hender-
son, Hargreaves, Gregory, & Williams, 2002) as well as clinical
samples. Clinical samples include depressed adult inpatients (Her-
mans et al., 2004), eating disorder patients (Dalgleish et al., 2003),
adolescent inpatients with emotional disorders (de Decker, Her-
mans, Raes, & Eelen, 2003), survivors with acute stress disorder
following a traffic accident (Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998) or
following a cancer diagnosis (Kangas, Henry, & Bryant, 2005),
and patients suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder
4 (PTSD;
e.g., Vietnam veterans; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman,
1995; McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 1994). The mean
effect size for those studies showing a significant association
between trauma and overgeneral memory is 1.13 (IQR  0.72).
The data suggest that a history of traumatic experiences is
closely linked to the occurrence of overgeneral memory deficits,
and this occurs despite the fact that individuals are not being asked
to retrieve memories related to their trauma. However, as studies
of war veterans (McNally et al., 1994, 1995), traffic accident
victims (Harvey et al., 1998), and cancer patients (Kangas et al.,
2005) show, the mere presence of a history of trauma is not
sufficient. These studies included control groups that had been
exposed to the trauma but for whom there was no prolonged
emotional disturbance or PTSD, and in these groups, an overgen-
erality memory deficit was not found. This suggests that the
relation between trauma and specificity of memory is moderated
by qualitative aspects of the trauma (e.g., how severe and pro-
longed the trauma was; Hermans et al., 2004) and the way in which
people cope with it (e.g., by attempted avoidance; Kuyken &
Brewin, 1995). People’s reactions to trauma may also be a function
of age. Willebrand et al. (2002) found that adult burn victims did
not differ from controls in memory specificity. However, if burns
are sustained in childhood, memory specificity is compromised
(Stokes, Dritschel, & Bekerian, 2004). The finding concerning the
relevance of the nature of the trauma is important because research
has found that usually, as time passes, negative events tend to lose
their capacity to provoke negative affect, a phenomenon referred to
as the fading affect bias. It is noteworthy that this effect is less
pronounced in individuals with dysphoria than in healthy controls
(e.g., Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003),
and so in addition to being more likely to have experienced
negative events, individuals with depression and PTSD are more
likely to continue to experience high levels of negative affect in
response to event recollection.
Although the majority of studies have found evidence of an
association between memory specificity and trauma, there are
some that have failed to replicate this effect (Arntz, Meeren, &
Wessel, 2002; Kremers, Spinhoven, & Van der Does, 2004;
Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002; Wessel,
Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2001; Wilhelm, McNally,
Baer, & Florin, 1997). However, these studies either involved low
3 The suggestion that a coexisting depressive disorder may produce
overgeneral memory in individuals with other forms of psychopathology is
supported by findings in other patient groups. For example the only study
to date that has examined memory specificity in obsessive–compulsive
disorder (OCD) compared outpatients with OCD with healthy controls and
found that the OCD patients were less specific (Wilhelm, McNally, Baer,
& Florin, 1997). However, further analysis indicated that medicated OCD
patients were less specific than unmedicated patients and that the depressed
medicated patients were the least specific of all, strongly suggesting that it
was depressive symptoms, rather than OCD per se, that accounted for the
differences between groups.
4 PTSD is diagnosed in individuals who have been exposed to a trau-
matic event during which they experienced intense fear, helplessness, or
horror experiences and who persistently reexperience the event (e.g.,
through dreams, flashbacks, reliving the event, distress, or physiological
arousal in response to internal or external cues that remind them of the
event); show persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma;
show a numbing of responsiveness; and have symptoms of increased
arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping, hypervigilance, irritability, exaggerated
startle response). These symptoms must be present for at least 1 month and
cause significant distress or impairment in functioning. Acute stress dis-
order is diagnosed if the duration of symptoms is less than 3 months.
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Summaries of Studies on Overgeneral Memory and Reported Trauma
Study Sample (no. female)
Cues (time per
cue in seconds) Variable Findings
Effect size
estimate (d)
McNally et al. (1994) 39 (0) veterans with PTSD
10 (0) veterans without
disorder
10 pos, 10 neg,
(60); half of
the cues taken
from Williams
& Dritschel
(1988)
Prop.
OG
PTSD  no PTSD for all cues
PTSD  no PTSD for cues
taken from Williams &
Dritschel
—
0.79
a
Kuyken & Brewin (1995) 19 MDD no abuse 5 pos, 5 neg (60) OG CSA  no CSA 0.68
b
9 MDD with CSA only CPA  no CPA —
10 MDD with CPA only
18 MDD with CSA and
CPA
McNally et al. (1995) 19 (0) veterans with PTSD 10 pos, 10 neg (60) Prop. S PTSD  no PTSD 0.78
a
13 (0) veterans without
PTSD
Wilhelm et al. (1997) 36 (16) patients with OCD
24 (10) controls
10 pos, 10 neg
(60)
Prop. S No significant relation with self-
reports of trauma on THQ rPS
 .26
0.53
a
Wessel et al. (2001) 93 outpatients and 24
controls
5 pos, 5 neg
(written test)
S No significant relation with self-
reports of trauma on CTQ
—
Arntz et al. (2002) 19 (6) MDD
11 (6) AD
9 (6) BPD
10 (6) other personality
disorders
5 pos, 5 neg
(written test)
S No significant prediction by
self-reports of trauma on CTQ
after controlling for
demographic variables and
diagnostic status
—
Henderson et al. (2002) 22 female students with
history of CSA
57 female students without
history of CSA
6 pos, 6 neg, 6
neutral (written
test)
S CSA  no CSA 0.86
a
Wessel et al. (2002) 25 (25) patients with
various disorders who
had been exposed to
war atrocities
10 pos, 10 neg
(60)
Prop. S Patients  Contr 1.55
b
15 (6) controls who had
been exposed to war
atrocities (Contr)
Willebrand et al. (2002) 18 (2) burn patients (BP)
18 (2) controls
10 pos, 10 neg
(30)
Prop. S BP  Contr 0.37
a
Dalgleish et al. (2003) 39 patients with eating
disorders
21 controls
5 pos, 5 neg (60) OG Correlation between self-report
of trauma on MOPS abuse
and overgenerality following
neg cues: .40*
D
0.87
c
de Decker et al. (2003) 28 inpatient adolescents 5 pos, 5 neg (30) S Correlations between self-report
of trauma on CTQ, total:
.60
**
1.50
a
Peeters et al. (2002) 25 patients with MDD 5 pos, 5 neg
(written)
S Self-reports of trauma on CTQ
predicted specific recall of
neg words
0.62
d
Kremers et al. (2004) 83 outpatients with BPD 5 pos, 5 neg (60) Prop. S Correlation with self-reports of
trauma on CTI: .04
0.08
a
Stokes et al. (2004) 12 (12) burn-injured
adolescents (BI)
5 pos, 5 neg (60) S BI  Contr 1.48
a
12 (12) controls
Hermans et al. (2004) 18 (13) inpatients with
MDD
5 pos, 5 neg (30) S Correlations with self-reports of
trauma on the TQ physical
abuse: .71
** (Total: .20)
2.01
a
0.41
a
Raes, Hermans, Williams, &
Eelen (2005)
27 (27) high-specific
students
25 (25) low-specific
students
5 pos, 5 neg (30) S Correlations with self-report of
trauma on the TEC (within
low-specific), emotional
abuse: .55
**
1.32
a
Note. Dashes indicate insufficient information to estimate effect size. Cues: pos  positive; neg  negative. Variables: OG  overgeneral memories; S 
specific memories. Prop.  proportion; PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; MDD  major depressive disorder; CSA  childhood sexual abuse; CPA 
childhood physical abuse; OCD  obsessive–compulsive disorder; THQ  Trauma History Questionnaire; CTQ  Childhood Trauma Questionnaire;
AD  anxiety disorder; BPD  borderline personality disorder; MOPS  Measure of Parental Style; CTI  Childhood Trauma Interview; TQ  Trauma
Questionnaire; TEC  Traumatic Experiences Checklist.
a Effect size for main effect.
b Effect size estimate based on data for positive and negative cues.
c Effect size based on positive cues only.
d Effect size
based on negative cues only.
*p  .05.
**p  .005.
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rather than trauma as their primary research question.
Although the studies in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the phenome-
non of overgeneral memory is associated with a diagnosis of depres-
sion and with a history of trauma and abuse, overgenerality is not
merely a marker of any psychopathology: It does not occur in general
anxiety disorder (Burke & Mathews, 1992), social phobia (Wenzel,
Jackson, & Holt, 2002), or blood and spider fearful individuals (Wen-
zel, Jackson, Brendle, & Pinna, 2003), and it was not found in a mixed
group of anxiety disorder patients (Wessel et al., 2001), even when the
cue words used reflected the current concerns of the participants (e.g.,
Wenzel et al., 2003). Unlike dysphoria, in which overgenerality is
found, it is not found in individuals with high trait anxiety (Richards
& Whittaker, 1990). In borderline personality disorder, although one
early study found more overgeneral memory in such patients (Jones et
al., 1999), other studies that have taken account of comorbid diag-
noses have not found it (Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et al., 2004). In
conclusion, overgenerality is relatively specific to those emotional
disorders that involve depression, PTSD, or both.
Why Is the Overgeneral Memory Phenomenon Important?
Interest in overgeneral memory has been fostered by findings
suggesting that the phenomenon is closely associated, and might have
a causal link, with other important aspects of psychological function-
ing. It has been found to be associated with (a) impaired problem
solving (Evans et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996; Goddard, Dritschel,
& Burton, 1997; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere, et al.,
2005; Scott et al., 2000), with specificity of memory moderating the
effect of negative mood disturbance on problem-solving performance
in previously suicidal patients (Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, & Beck,
2005); (b) problems in imagining future events, with overgenerality
for past events predicting nonspecificity in specifying future events
(Williams et al., 1996); and (c) delayed recovery from episodes of
affective disorders (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993;
Dalgleish et al., 2001; Harvey et al., 1998; Peeters et al., 2002; though
see Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999, for a failure to replicate).
The phenomenon has also been seen as important because memory
remains overgeneral in those with a history of emotional disorder,
even if not currently in an episode (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibet-
seder, 2000; Mackinger, Pachinger, et al., 2000; Williams &
Dritschel, 1988). This is significant because it means that the phe-
nomenon can be observed without needing to be activated by low
mood and might therefore act as a between-episode “marker” of
future vulnerability to depression. More recent studies are consistent
with this notion: Overgeneral memory assessed when one is not
depressed predicts later mood disturbance. This has been found for
premenstrual dysphoria (Mackinger, Kunz-Dorfer, Schneider, & Lei-
betseder, 2001), postpartum depressed mood (Mackinger, Loschin, &
Leibetseder, 2000), depressive symptoms following life events in
students (Gibbs & Rude, 2004), and emotional reactivity following a
failed in vitro fertilization treatment (van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak,
& Smeenk, 2005).
Methodological Limitations
In this section we consider a number of methodological prob-
lems that exist in some of these studies that may limit the conclu-
sions that may be drawn from them.
Number and Content of the Words Used as Cues
There is great variation in the number of cues used across the
different studies. For example, in the 30 affective disorders studies
reported in Table 1, the minimum number is a single cue used to
investigate memory of 90 undergraduates, by Moffitt et al. (1994);
the maximum is 30 cues, used by Ramponi et al. (2004). Across
the studies, however, there is no significant correlation between
number of cues used and the effect size found, r(28)  .27. The
content of the cues may be more problematic, in that studies have
tended to use the same or similar lists of cue words. Although this
means that it is easier to compare across studies, possible idiosyn-
crasies in the words used might give rise to anomalous findings
that are repeated across studies. On the other hand, those studies
that have used different cuing procedures (e.g., Moore et al., 1988,
which used vignettes such as “Recall a time when a neighbour
helped you with a practical problem”) have reported large effect
sizes (1.15 in this study), suggesting that the phenomenon is
relatively robust across different cuing procedures.
General Intelligence or Memory Ability
It is possible that differences in levels of IQ or memory account
for the nonspecificity observed, and not all studies have taken
adequate account of this possibility. Nevertheless, those studies
that have controlled for number of years in education, IQ, semantic
processing speed, or semantic fluency (e.g., Park, Goodyer, &
Teasdale, 2002; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Scott,
1988) have found that group differences remain even after match-
ing for such variables. On the other hand, mixed conclusions
emerge from those studies that have explored possible associations
between overgeneral autobiographical memory in depression and
performance in other memory domains. Wessel, Merckelbach, and
Dekkers (2002) included a set of neuropsychological tests on
semantic and episodic memory in their study of autobiographical
memory in patients with various psychiatric diagnoses (predomi-
nantly PTSD). Performance on these tests, however, did not add
any explanatory variance in the prediction of autobiographical
memory specificity beyond general participant characteristics
(such as IQ), and such characteristics had been found by the same
authors not to account for differences between depressed and
nondepressed patients (Wessel et al., 2001). Williams and
Dritschel (1992) reported significant associations between healthy
controls’ poor performance on verbal category fluency tasks (se-
mantic memory) and greater overgeneral categorical memory re-
trieval, though the absolute levels of correlation were low, and an
earlier study in suicidal patients had found no such correlation
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986). A study of psychiatric inpatient
adolescents suffering from a variety of psychological disorders, by
de Decker, Hermans, Raes, and Eelen (2003), reported moderate
but statistically nonsignificant correlations between immediate and
delayed story recall (episodic memory) and number of specific
memories and found no correlation between nonspecificity and a
measure of working memory central executive capacity.
However, Ramponi et al. (2004) tested autobiographical and
episodic (recognition) memory in a dysphoric and nondysphoric
group. The episodic memory task involved presenting emotionally
neutral words for a subsequent recognition test using a remember–
know procedure. They found that specificity of autobiographical
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requires recollection of contextual detail—the circumstances in
which the word was previously seen) but not to knowing (which
does not). Furthermore, they found that depressive rumination, the
tendency to ponder repeatedly on the reasons and implications of
one’s (depressed) feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), was related
to poor performance on both the autobiographical and the episodic
memory task.
Recent data extend this conclusion. Raes, Hermans, Williams,
Demyttenaere, et al. (2006) found that autobiographical memory
specificity was not related to performance on a range of memory
tasks, including semantic memory (fluency tasks) and episodic
memory (verbal learning, delayed free-recall), suggesting that
overgeneral autobiographical memory was not merely a reflection
of a general memory deficit linked to depression. On the other
hand, they did find, as predicted, a close association with a
measure of source memory—that is, misassignment of correctly
recognized words to the “wrong” (distractor) list—and that both
overgeneral memory and poor source memory were associated
with rumination (even after partialing out depression).
We conclude that although overgenerality in autobiographical
memory is likely related in some cases to general memory deficits,
it is not wholly explained by such deficits. It is associated with
those aspects of memory that depend on recalling contextual detail.
Depression and Trauma History Confounded
A third possible methodological limitation is that the published
studies have tended to examine either depression (see Table 1) or
patients with a history of trauma (see Table 2). Authors naturally
attribute differences found between the clinical and control groups
to the variable of interest (depression or trauma), and few studies
have examined both (though see Kuyken, Howell, & Dalgleish,
2006). In particular, no study has used a 2  2 design to examine
people who either have or do not have depression, with or without
a history of trauma. For example, studies that examine patients
with PTSD do not report whether these patients have a history of
major depression, although such information is necessary in order
for us to be confident that variance in overgenerality is attributable
to a history of trauma, rather than to major depression. Although
the balance of findings suggest that trauma is likely to be important
in understanding the development of overgeneral memory, further
investigation of this issue is clearly required. Such studies would
be important for the additional reason that, at the moment, it is
unclear why a diagnosis of depression is associated with overgen-
eral memory whereas the severity of symptoms within depressed
groups does not correlate with the degree of overgenerality (Burn-
side, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson, & Hill, 2004; Henderson et al.,
2002; Hermans et al., 2004; Jones et al., 1999; Kremers et al.,
2004; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Laberg & Andersson, 2004; Mer-
ckelbach, Muris, & Horselenberg, 1996; Peeters et al., 2002;
Phillips & Williams, 1997; Raes, Pousset, & Hermans, 2004;
Wessel et al., 2001; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams &
Dritschel, 1988; Williams et al., 1996). One possibility is that it is
the degree to which a person has suffered or remains preoccupied
with prior trauma or adversity that is critical, rather than other
aspects of depressive symptomatology. Future studies on de-
pressed or previously depressed groups, with and without trauma
history, are required to disentangle these contributing factors.
Retrospective Assessment of Trauma
A limitation associated with some of the studies examining
trauma and memory specificity is that trauma was assessed retro-
spectively. As such, the actual presence of a history of adversities
is difficult to verify. In other studies, however, trauma was docu-
mented by means of case records (Meesters, Merckelbach, Muris,
& Wessel, 2000), or the adversities were of a more observable
nature, like war trauma (de Decker, 2001), cancer diagnoses (Kan-
gas et al., 2005), and burn accidents (Stokes et al., 2004).
Too Few Longitudinal Studies
Another, more general limitation is that in most studies, because
trauma and memory are examined cross-sectionally (instead of lon-
gitudinally), it is not possible to determine the causal relationship
between overgeneral memory deficits and the experience of trauma.
Difficulties in being specific may be an aftereffect of trauma or of
depression (the scarring hypothesis) or, alternatively, may be an
antecedent, making the development of depression or PTSD more
likely following a negative event (the vulnerability hypothesis).
Evidence in favor of the scarring hypothesis comes from Stokes et
al. (2004), who found greater nonspecific memory in adolescent burn
victims compared with controls. Evidence in favor of the vulnerability
hypothesis comes from the few longitudinal studies that have assessed
specificity of memory before participants become depressed (Gibbs &
Rude, 2004; Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; Mackinger,
Pachinger, et al., 2000; van Minnen et al., 2005). However, because in
three of these studies (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000;
Mackinger, Pachinger, et al., 2000; van Minnen et al., 2005) prior
trauma experiences and history of prior depression were not compre-
hensively assessed, one cannot exclude the additional possibility that
level of memory specificity (i.e., the level of vulnerability) is ex-
plained by a prior history of adverse experiences. Of course, even if
overgeneral memory arises from the scarring effect of prior adversity,
it may still play an important role in acting as a mediator between that
adversity and future psychological functioning. If environmental ad-
versity is found to have long-term impact on an individual, then it can
do so only by producing either long-term changes in the environment
or long-term changes in the individual. Overgenerality in memory
may be just such a long-term effect.
In conclusion, we still cannot be sure the extent to which overgen-
eral memory prior to trauma renders people vulnerable for developing
emotional problems following trauma experience or how much the
trauma itself negatively affects memory specificity. More longitudinal
prospective studies that make detailed assessment of individuals be-
fore and after trauma are required to resolve this issue.
Summary
In this section we have reviewed a number of methodological
issues in the research on overgeneral memory. Studies vary in the
extent to which each is able to take account of these limitations in its
design. However, what is clear from the data is that, notwithstanding
the methodological noise and variety across the studies, the effects are
remarkably consistent and the effect sizes large. In the next section we
turn to what mechanisms might explain the phenomenon.
Mechanisms Underlying Overgeneral Memory Retrieval
Early accounts (Williams, 1996) explained overgeneral memory
retrieval within the framework of descriptions theory (Burgess &
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voluntary retrieval as “a process in which some information about a
target item is used to construct a description of the item and this
description is used in attempts to recover new fragments of informa-
tion” (M. D. Williams & Hollan, 1981, p. 87). An underlying assumption
of descriptions theory is that autobiographical memories are stored as
records of events and that these records are organized in hierarchies
leading from general to more specific event representations.
The distinction between general and specific event representations
is not new (see Barsalou, 1988; Neisser, 1986; Nelson, 1988). Every-
one needs access to both episodic information and general summary
information to navigate successfully through the interpersonal and
instrumental demands of daily living. In many situations, such as the
ubiquitous restaurant situation, general scriptlike knowledge will be
adequate (enter, find a seat, examine menu, order, eat, pay, leave).
But restaurants do differ one from the other—some have their menus
written on a blackboard on the wall, and some demand ordering food
at the bar, and so waiting for the waiter to deliver a menu or take an
order will lead to frustration. For a successful restaurant experience,
we need to have access both to our general restaurant scripts and to the
episodic memories, the “tags” that differentiate this one from others
and allow us to take account of any particular peculiarities (Schank &
Abelson, 1977).
Although the notion of a hierarchical representation of autobio-
graphical knowledge has remained an integral aspect of autobiograph-
ical memory models (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), it has become
increasingly clear that retrieval of autobiographical memories is not
restricted to the matching of static records but involves the construc-
tion of memories from a pool of available memory components or
features. Recent models consequently stress the role of central exec-
utive control in the activation and inhibition of memory components
as well as the importance of the current motivations and goal structure
of the individual. One of the most comprehensive models of this type
is the self-memory model by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), an
account derived from research on autobiographical memory in non-
clinical groups. We describe this model in some detail and then
evaluate evidence from the clinical literature to see how the model can
be elaborated to account for the data from psychopathology. Finally,
we return to examine the implications these findings have for future
research into this aspect of memory.
5
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory System
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) described autobiographical
memories as “transitory dynamic mental constructions generated
from an underlying knowledge base” (p. 261). Their model in-
cludes three levels of representation within the autobiographical
knowledge base (see Figure 1). The highest level consists of
representations of prolonged periods of time with relatively dis-
tinct start and end points, referred to as lifetime periods (e.g.,
“when I lived in Cambridge”). At an intermediate level, general
event descriptions represent repeated events (e.g., “driving to work
in the mornings”) or single events (e.g., “my holiday in Egypt”),
again in the form of relatively abstract, conceptual summaries of
experience. The hierarchy is nested such that general event repre-
sentations (assumed to be the preferred or default level of
access into the autobiographical memory knowledge base) are
associated with the specific lifetime periods in which they
occurred: For example, the general event “taking my children to
playgroup” would be associated with the lifetime period “when
my children were small.” They are also associated with infor-
mation encoded at the lowest level, referred to as event-specific
knowledge (ESK). ESK differs from general event and lifetime
period representations in that it consists primarily of more
concrete sensory–perceptual aspects of unique events, often
including visual imagery rather than abstract, conceptual, ver-
bal summaries of past experience.
It is suggested that the autobiographical knowledge base under-
goes continuous fluctuation of activity, as environmental and in-
ternal cues activate aspects of stored representations. The retrieval
of a specific autobiographical memory occurs when the knowledge
base settles into a stable state, with simultaneous and coordinated
activity in the stored representation of an event at the ESK, general
event, and lifetime period levels.
The Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) model, as well as other
accounts (e.g., Burgess & Shallice, 1996), suggests that these
patterns of activation can be generated via two different processes:
a generative retrieval process and a spontaneous form of retrieval
following direct activation of autobiographical knowledge. Gen-
erative retrieval refers to top-down search processes involving the
use of verbal/abstract (conceptual) representations, corresponding
to the “intermediate descriptions” of Norman and Bobrow (1979).
The first stage of generative retrieval involves the specification
and elaboration of mnemonic cues using verbal associations,
which will form the basis for memory search (e.g., happy: “my
dog, Tessa”). Criteria to evaluate the degree to which activated
representations match retrieval specifications are also established
at this stage. Once the search criteria are specified, lifetime period
(“when I lived in Stockton”) or general event level knowledge (“I
used to take her for walks”) is rapidly activated, with general event
knowledge appearing to be the most common point of entry into
the memory system. Activation then spreads through the knowl-
edge base from general event representations to ESK (“One day
we went for a walk in the woods and she chased a rabbit”).
6
5 Although the explanations of overgeneral memory to be considered focus
on the normative cognitive psychology literature, we acknowledge that there
may be parallel explanations in cognitive models of depression—either cog-
nitive resource models (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & Rude, 1991;
Zacks & Hasher, 1994) or models based on negative self-representations or
schemas (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). We take the opportunity in
later sections, in which we examine the predictions from Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model for overgeneral memory, to illustrate how this
approach is compatible with these cognitive models of depression and psy-
chopathology.
6 Although generative retrieval is generally conceived as a strategic
process, it is important to note that it is, in large part, concerned with the
guidance of associative processing components. Supervisory executive
capacities are needed in order to set up the retrieval model based on task
analysis, and this retrieval model is held in working memory during the
retrieval process. At the same time, however, activation of elements within
the knowledge base occurs automatically and follows an associative pattern
in which activation is channeled by the indices of the knowledge structure.
During this stage, effortful processes are required to evaluate the automat-
ically activated knowledge and to guide the search while inhibiting further
processing of irrelevant knowledge. Effortful processing is also necessary
to maintain a specific memory once the search has resulted in a stable
pattern of activation in the knowledge base.
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rently active representations match the search criteria and progres-
sively refine the pattern of activation. Indeed, because activation
spreads both from one general event description to other related
general event descriptions and from single general event descriptions
to a large number of elements of ESK, it is assumed that supervisory
executive processes are required to inhibit activation of irrelevant
representations, allowing the system to settle into a stable state.
Direct retrieval, in contrast, corresponds to the subjective ex-
perience of spontaneous recollection and arises when an internal or
environmental cue produces immediate activation of ESK. Be-
cause, according to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), ESK is
typically linked to only one general event level representation,
which in turn is linked to only one lifetime period (see Figure 1),
a coordinated pattern of activation is quickly established, and there
is less need for inhibitory control from central executive resources.
As a result, direct retrieval is more rapid and less resource de-
manding than generative retrieval, although for both forms of
retrieval it is suggested that the activated pattern must be linked to
an individual’s active goal structure for a memory to be formed.
Consistent with the Conway and Pleydell-Pearce model, Berntsen
(1998) has demonstrated that memories recollected as a conse-
Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of autobiographical memory. From “Memory and the Self,” by M. A. Conway,
2005, Journal of Memory and Language, 53, p. 609. Copyright 2005 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
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and less rehearsed than memories that are deliberately recollected
in response to cue words.
The self-memory system. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce
(2000) suggested that autobiographical memory needs to be
seen in terms of its relationship to an individual’s sense of self
and of its central importance in guidance of goal-directed
activity. From this perspective autobiographical memory can be
viewed as one part of a larger “self-memory system” (for
further elaboration, see Conway, 2005; Conway, Singer, &
Tagini, 2004) with two functions: to maintain adaptive corre-
spondence (the creation of a relatively accurate record of on-
going experience to be used to guide goal pursuit) and to ensure
self-coherence (to develop an integrated and meaningful repre-
sentation of one’s self and one’s life story that is consistent with
goals and values).
The working self. Central to the self-memory system of Con-
way and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) is the working self. The working
self operates a number of coordinated control processes that initi-
ate and monitor goal-directed activity and create a model of the
psychological present. The autobiographical knowledge base and
conceptual self together form the long-term self. The conceptual
self contains abstract self-knowledge such as attitudes, beliefs, and
self-guides, which are constrained by and associated with the
general event, lifetime period, and self-schema representations of
the autobiographical knowledge base. The episodic memory sys-
tem, lower in the hierarchy, contains sensory–perceptual ESK,
which, if relevant to ongoing goal processing, becomes linked to
stored representations in the autobiographical knowledge base and
is available for later retrieval (when activated in conjunction with
general event, lifetime period, and life-story representations of the
event). As well as determining which aspects of ESK become
integrated with the autobiographical memory base (being retained
for later retrieval), the working self influences which episodic
memories are retrievable at any given point in time, retrieval being
dependent to a large degree on the extent to which episodic
memories are consistent with and relevant to the current goals of
the working self.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) assume that ongoing expe-
rience that is not relevant to active goals is unlikely to be inte-
grated into the autobiographical knowledge base. Similarly, expe-
riences that are relevant to ongoing goal processing but challenge
self-coherence to an unacceptable degree are also unlikely to be
integrated into the long-term self (see, e.g., Dalgleish, 2004, for a
discussion).
How Does Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Model Explain
Overgeneral Memory?
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggested that overgeneral
memory arises when individuals truncate their search during gen-
erative, top-down retrieval at too high a level, when only general
descriptive information has been accessed. This hierarchical com-
ponent of their model is the aspect that most closely maps onto the
original descriptions theory of Norman and Bobrow (1979) and
explains why memories are nonspecific rather than simply slowed
down or fragmented. Normally, individuals have some strategic
control over how much of the memory “hierarchy” needs to be
searched in order to meet the requirements of the task specificity.
Depressed and suicidal patients access an intermediate description
but stop short of a specific example. Their memory aborts the
search for a specific event prematurely, when only the general
description stage has been reached. This truncated search, called
by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce a dysfacilitation of the retrieval
process, is assumed to underlie the retrieval of overgeneral mem-
ories. Why does such dysfacilitation occur?
Because episodic memories (ESK) are “experience-near” sum-
mary records containing sensory–perceptual and conceptual affec-
tive features of an experience, these are assumed to be represented
primarily in analogue form and usually in visual imagery. For
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model, therefore, one very
important property is that when they enter consciousness they
hijack attention. Because of this, their entry into consciousness
must be carefully coordinated, not least in order to maintain focus
on current goal pursuit. Individuals who have experienced trau-
matic events or adversity that challenges fundamental beliefs about
self and world are likely to be most prone to interruption of
ongoing processing by such sensory representations. Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce assume, therefore, that truncated search represents
a passive avoidance reaction that arises because representations of
past trauma and adversity, encoded within the episodic memory
system, create negative affect as the retrieval search begins to elicit
perceptual–sensory fragments of aversive events (cf. Williams,
1996). These fragments, because of the affect they threaten to
create and associated interference with attention and pursuit of
current goals, always elicit attempts from higher executive systems
to inhibit them. Such inhibition we call functional avoidance,a si t
is originally learned because it reduces or avoids short-term affec-
tive disturbance, though as we shall see, this affect regulation
comes at a long-term cost.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model allows for the
possibility that overgeneral memory might arise from functional
avoidance at both encoding and retrieval. For example, it suggests
that if ESK is not consistent with current working self at the time
of encoding, it will not become linked to stored representations in
the autobiographical knowledge base and therefore will not be
available for later retrieval. If there is an encoding failure, ESK
will be impoverished in individuals with depression (and other
conditions) so that any preponderance of categorical responses to
word cues will arise because autobiographical information is more
likely to be encoded in abstracted ways in these groups.
If overgeneral memory does arise because memories are en-
coded in a permanently impoverished or inaccessible form, then it
should be difficult to bring about change through laboratory ma-
nipulation or clinical intervention. However, in a series of studies,
Watkins and colleagues have shown that laboratory manipulations
that prevent rumination in depressed participants result in more
specific memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins,
Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), indicating that to some degree, the
specificity of memory recall depends on the activation of a par-
ticular mental state or mode of processing at the time of recall.
Second, a clinical procedure known to reduce risk of relapse and
recurrence in patients that have experienced episodes of depression
in the past (mindfulness-based cognitive therapy; Segal, Williams,
& Teasdale, 2002) reduces overgenerality in autobiographical
memory (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). This effect
was independent of change in mood over the course of the treat-
ment program. Each of these studies suggests that it is a failure to
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for overgenerality in memory.
We have seen that Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model
of autobiographical memory explains overgenerality by a trunca-
tion of the retrieval search (dysfacilitation) when the initial acti-
vation of ESK threatens to increase affective disturbance or chal-
lenge current priorities of the working self. This explanation is
similar to the affect regulation model proposed by Williams
(1996), though much more clearly elaborated in terms of the
maintenance of self-coherence. Like Williams’s affect regulation
model, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s account places functional
avoidance at the heart of their explanation of overgeneral memory.
However, although functional avoidance explains the association
of overgeneral memory with trauma history, it gives relatively less
weight to the fact that the phenomenon is observed in depressed
patients even in the absence of trauma (Wessel et al., 2001). In the
next section, we describe a model, CaR-FA-X, that elaborates
features of the Conway and Pleydell-Pearce model to suggest three
mechanisms—capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoid-
ance (FA), and impaired executive control (X)—that, alone or in
combination, underlie overgeneral memory. We begin by examin-
ing the functional avoidance aspect, which remains central to our
model.
CaR-FA-X: Explaining the Mechanisms Underlying
Overgeneral Memory
Functional Avoidance
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) explanation of overgen-
eral memory is that the recollection of general descriptions may
produce less affect than the recollection of specific episodic mem-
ories, thus enabling current goal pursuit to be maintained in the
face of potential deflection. Remaining at the level of more general
information reduces the impact of potentially emotional material.
Such a functional avoidance hypothesis would be consistent with
current models of PTSD (Brewin, 2001; Brewin, Dalgleish, &
Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986). These
models converge on the view that intrusive images or memories
and flashbacks arise from the relatively automatic activation of
mnemonic material related to the trauma (e.g., Brewin et al.’s,
1996, “situationally accessible memories,” similar to Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce’s “direct retrieval”). This direct activation of ESK
interrupts concurrent processing and results in a number of strat-
egies to exercise top-down control to attempt to avoid such high-
risk situations and memories.
For instance, when retrieving even relatively neutral events,
someone who has experienced a traumatic event may discover that
ESK brings about negative affect. For instance, consider the fol-
lowing protocol from a patient in response to the cue summer. She
was thinking back of summer holidays and found “hot summer
evenings” coming to mind. Further specifying on this theme, she
began to retrieve a specific summer evening when, although al-
ready after 10:00 p.m., the temperature was still agreeable, and she
was sitting outside with friends talking about the new puppy she
had bought. Subsequently, however, this triggered another mem-
ory from that same summer when she was assaulted when walking
the dog in the neighborhood park. From a learning perspective, the
very act of specifying memories from the general event descrip-
tions level to the level of ESK was followed by a negative
consequence. This contingency then becomes the basis for passive
avoidance. Next time, when thinking about warm summer eve-
nings, the person will more likely choose to remain at the level of
the general description.
We suggest that the association between negative affect and
specific retrieval can develop into the passive avoidance of aver-
sive ESK—avoidance of the sensory and perceptual fragments of
an event that, if activated, might produce large and catastrophic
increases in mood disturbance. A strategy of truncating the search
before accessing such specific representations will, if it avoids
such aversive consequences, be negatively reinforced. The result is
cognitive avoidance: the dysfacilitation of a cognitive process that
is expected to lead, if not truncated, to aversive consequences. We
suggest that dysfacilitation as an avoidant coping style is a process
that is shaped by contingencies and takes some time to develop.
For some persons it might remain a flexible and helpful strategy in
warding off negative emotions, whereas for others it might develop
into an inflexible and habitual response pattern (Raes, Hermans,
Williams, & Eelen, 2006). Although it is possible that this func-
tional memory strategy is governed by consciously controlled
processes, we do not exclude the possibility that it is a response
that is shaped without the involvement of conscious monitoring. In
the next section, we review data that support the view that trun-
cated search is a functional process, based on principles of passive
avoidance.
Correlational evidence for this view stems from a number of
studies that have included the Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horow-
itz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). The IES is a 15-item questionnaire
with two subscales that assess two stress reactions that are com-
monly associated with PTSD: the amount of intrusions (7 items)
and avoidance (8 items). A number of studies have revealed a
significant correlation between IES avoidance and autobiographi-
cal memory responses: The higher the score on the avoidance scale
is, the more overgeneral is the participant (e.g., Kuyken & Brewin,
1995; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Brunfaut, et al., 2006; Stokes et
al., 2004; Wessel et al., 2002). Brewin et al. (1999) failed to
replicate this correlation with avoidance. Although many of the
depressed patients in their study had encountered stressful events,
it is unclear whether this group was characterized by a particular
history of trauma or other adversities.
In a more direct test of the relation between overgeneral mem-
ory and avoidance, Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, and Eelen
(2005) suggested that if individuals retrieve memories in a less
specific way to avoid negative memories, one might predict that
these nonspecific individuals will—in general, and as compared
with more specific persons—also rely more on an avoidant style in
dealing with thoughts, feelings, problems, and situations. In other
words, individuals with a less specific retrieval style are expected
to engage in more avoidant behavior in general. This is exactly
what was observed. The less specific the participant was, the
higher were the scores on a range of avoidance questionnaires.
This was demonstrated for a variety of coping behaviors, ranging
from social behavioral avoidance (Cognitive Behavioural Avoid-
ance Scale; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004) and experiential avoid-
ance (Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; Hayes et al., in press)
to thought suppression (White Bear Suppression Inventory; Weg-
ner & Zanakos, 1994). Together with the data from the IES, these
results are consistent with the assumption that overgeneral auto-
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through passive avoidance (Hermans et al., 2005).
Until recently, however, there was no independent experimental
evidence that suggested that a functional affect regulating mech-
anism might explain the overgeneral memory phenomenon. At a
minimum, any such functional avoidance theory requires that, at
some point, a person who tends to retrieve memory more specif-
ically would risk experiencing greater affective disturbance. Oth-
erwise, there is no motivation for the negative reinforcement of a
less specific retrieval style. Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, and
Williams (2003) showed just such evidence. They found that
degree of mood disturbance following experimental manipulation
of frustration using a tangram puzzle task (in which the partici-
pants—student volunteers—thought they were doing badly) was
greater in those participants with a more specific retrieval style.
These results illustrate the possible payoff for people with a less
specific retrieval style: They are less emotionally aroused by a
negative personal experience. As such, these results are consistent
with a functional avoidance perspective on reduced specificity of
autobiographical memory.
Raes, Hermans, Williams, and Eelen (2006) replicated these
results and additionally showed that participants who were low in
specificity tended to be high repressors (defined as a combination
of low trait anxiety and high defensiveness on the Marlowe–
Crowne Social Desirability Scales; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).
Even when repression scores were covaried, however, specificity
of memory still predicted the affective reaction to failure on a
puzzle task.
What Are the Limitations of the Functional Avoidance
Model?
A clear pattern has emerged, showing that various types of
trauma are associated with a reduction in specificity of autobio-
graphical memory, making the functional avoidance account of
overgeneral memory a plausible one. Nevertheless, some critical
examination of such a functional avoidance perspective on reduced
specificity of autobiographical memory is warranted.
Are there data that contradict the functional avoidance hypoth-
esis? One possible issue is the pattern of valence effects. If
overgeneral memory arises from a “stop” rule introduced at a point
in the retrieval search where fragments of unpleasant memories
begin to be accessed, then we might expect that such overgener-
ality would be more likely to be shown in response to negative
cues than positive cues. This does not occur. Whereas the data
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 confirm the general phenomenon in
depressed and traumatized groups, studies have found mixed ev-
idence with regard to whether specificity varies with the valence of
the cue word. In fact, early studies found that overgenerality was
more likely to occur for positive memories. However, this valence
effect has not been consistently demonstrated in later studies, and
a meta-analysis of 14 studies concluded that such patients are
overgeneral in their memories following both positive and nega-
tive cues, with overgenerality for positive and negative memories
being highly intercorrelated (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004).
We are now able to examine the more extended list of studies in
Table 1. Out of the 30 studies reported, the majority (18) reported
a main effect for the difference between depressed and control
participants. Of the studies that also reported a significant inter-
action between group and cue valence, 8 out of 9 found that
positive cues elicited more overgeneral memories (Dalgleish et al.,
2001; Moffitt et al., 1994; Moore et al., 1988; Park et al., 2002;
Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier, & Timsit, 1991; Williams
& Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Williams &
Scott, 1988), with only one finding this effect more for negative
cues (Mansell & Lam, 2004). Overall, the studies that reported
sufficient data to compute effect sizes for different cue-valence
conditions show that differences between depressed and control
participants in overgenerality to positive cues yield an effect size
of 0.91, whereas that for negative cues is 0.48.
A similar pattern emerges when we examine the Table 2 studies,
in which participants’ actual or reported history of trauma has been
recorded and where a functional avoidance model would be most
likely to predict overgenerality to negative cues. Of the 12 studies
in Table 2, only 2 reported that overgenerality in response to
negative cues was associated with trauma (Dalgleish et al., 2003;
Peeters et al., 2002), 9 reported that trauma history is associated
with both valences, and 1 reported that negative cues elicited more
specific memories (Burnside et al., 2004). The only difference
between the pattern of these studies and those for depression is that
none of the trauma studies shows significantly increased overgen-
erality for positive cues, though the mean effect sizes for those
studies of trauma that give sufficient information to compute them
were 0.97 for positive and 0.82 for negative cues. However, the
predominant finding for both domains (depression and trauma) is
that overgenerality is found for both positive and negative cues. To
what extent does this pattern of data raise difficulties for any
model that explains nonspecificity in terms of truncated search
(dysfacilitation) due to functional avoidance alone?
In fact, valence effects may not challenge a functional avoidance
model as much as it first appears. This is because positive words
might just as easily trigger negative memory fragments that then
need to be inhibited. Cue word valence does not necessarily mirror
the valence of the memories elicited. As in our earlier example, the
positive cue word summer elicited very specific traumatic memo-
ries. As a matter of fact, for many emotionally disturbed patients,
negative memories are often the result of emotionally discrepant
cues (e.g., happy, relaxed). We suggest that an effective avoidance
strategy can never be selective. Given that the associative path-
ways of human memory are often rather unpredictable, overgen-
eral memory as an avoidance strategy can be successful only if it
is applied not just with respect to the traumatic (or, more broadly,
negative) memories but to memory in general. If a person does not
want to remember the assault that he or she experienced when
visiting an uncle in the summer of 1969, then it does not help to be
overgeneral only for cues like trauma or rape. Even positive or
neutral words, like holiday or journey, might lead to these specific
painful memories. In a sense, this is true for all forms of avoidance.
For instance, if a socially anxious person wants to be sure not to be
confronted with unpleasant social situations, there will be a need to
avoid all social interactions, including those that seem inherently
pleasant, like parties and other festivities. If one does not want to
be confronted with painful social situations, one has to avoid them
all. We suggest that the same may hold for painful specific
memories: If one wants to be sure not to encounter painful episodic
memories about the past, one has to be nonspecific for all mem-
ories.
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field of repression. For example, Blagov and Singer (2004) found
a correlation between repressive defensiveness (as measured by
the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory—Short Form) and memory
specificity, with higher defensiveness being associated with fewer
specific memories recalled. However, higher defensiveness did not
interact with valence of the memory: It was not related to the
number or specificity of positive or negative memories recalled. It
also was not related to the content of the memories. Consistent
with the current model, Blagov and Singer suggested that repres-
sion may be about an initial preemptive screening to avoid any
type of specific material—good or bad—as this is the most effec-
tive blanket kind of defense. Material that gets through the screen,
according to Blagov and Singer, may be sanitized of its emotional
power and immediacy, despite its putative valence and content.
Why, then, do some studies show greater overgenerality to
positive cues? One possibility is that this is simply a mood-
congruence effect. It is known that depressed mood reduces the
availability of positive mnemonic material (Eich, 1995; Williams,
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), and this may reduce the
material that is available to elaborate the search cues if patients are
tested while in a dysphoric mood.
7 If this were the case, then if
patients are tested when recovered, we should see a reversal in the
positive–negative pattern of overgenerality. Only three studies
have examined patients in remission and compared them with
healthy controls (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; Mack-
inger, Pachinger, et al., 2000; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). In each
case, ex-patients remained more overgeneral overall, but in each
study, responses to positive cues were relatively less overgeneral
than responses to negative cues (effect sizes of 0.63 vs. 1.21, 0.72
vs. 1.38, and 0.75 vs. 1.10 for positive vs. negative cues, respec-
tively), as predicted by a mood-congruence hypothesis.
We have seen that whereas the findings that overgenerality is
shown in response to both positive and negative cues might seem
to present a problem for a functional avoidance account, the
inherent ambivalence of cues and mood congruence could together
explain the pattern of data. There is, however, another reason why
some cues may elicit overgeneral memories in some individuals:
the fact that the cue represents a current concern that gives rise to
rumination. Because there is a large amount of evidence that
rumination is a core feature of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991), it is important to consider how it may affect overgenerality.
It is to this aspect that we now turn.
The “Capture” of Retrieval by Abstract–Conceptual
(Ruminative) Structures
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) self-memory model is
consistent with multiple-memory models (such as Johnson’s Mul-
tiple Entry Modular Memory System; Johnson, 1992), in which
memory can have both semantic and perceptual representations.
Further, it assumes that early stages of retrieval use more concep-
tual processing: Many of the intermediate descriptions that are
used to aid retrieval in autobiographical memory are conceptually
based self-representations, including personal semantic memories
(names of friends, teachers, ex-colleagues, etc.; Dritschel, Wil-
liams, Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992), self-referential at-
tributes, and/or abstracted representations of generic aspects of the
self and experience (Conway et al., 2004). There is some evidence
to suggest that this predominance of conceptual self-relevant in-
formation in the early stages of memory search may lead to
difficulties with the retrieval of specific memories in two circum-
stances: first, in individuals who possess highly activated or elab-
orated repertoires of emotion-related self-representations, and sec-
ond, in individuals prone to rumination (repetitive and passive
thinking about one’s symptoms of depression and the possible
causes and consequences of these symptoms; Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991). We examine each of these groups in turn.
Individuals suffering from depression represent a group in
whom emotion-related conceptual self-representations are highly
active. These representations can be regarded as similar to the
“negative self-schemas” described by traditional cognitive therapy
models of depression (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; see Segal, 1988).
Because cue words on the AMT are often emotional words, they
may be more likely to activate conceptual, abstract information in
individuals who are depressed and for whom negative self-
representations are already in a state of heightened accessibility.
Rather than aiding the memory search process, this may result in
individuals’ becoming “captured,” resulting in difficulties in pro-
gressing to the retrieval of specific autobiographical memories.
Consistent with this, Singer and Moffitt (1992) found, in a study of
autobiographical memory in students, that a request for personally
significant memories relevant to one’s self-understanding in-
creased the number of summary (i.e., overgeneral) memory nar-
ratives retrieved, relative to standard instructions.
Over time the tendency to be “captured” may increase further as
a result of mnemonic interlock (Williams, 1996). Mnemonic inter-
lock refers to the suggestion that if early truncation of the search
process at the intermediate description level is followed by further
abortive attempts at retrieval, the conceptual network of interme-
diate descriptions will become increasingly elaborated. The result
may be that in future attempts at retrieval, initial cues become
more and more likely to activate intermediate descriptions, which
then simply activate other intermediate descriptions, rather than
sensory–perceptual episodic detail. Seen from a multicomponent
memory perspective, if people rehearse events in more semantic
ways, the semantic representations will be strengthened and make
that representation more likely to be retrieved than the perceptual
representation. This may be exacerbated in the context of ineffi-
cient cognitive control (Hertel, 2004) or diminished capacity (dis-
cussed later) and may result in individuals’ finding themselves
moving across rather than down the memory hierarchy.
Recent data support the operation of such mnemonic interlock.
Barnhofer and colleagues examined the sequence of retrieval ele-
ments during generative retrieval in response to a cue word. They
7 Although most experiments focusing on overgenerality in memory do
not report latencies, as these are confounded with the time taken by the
experimenter in prompting participants whose first response is nonspecific,
early studies did examine latency to each successive response. Williams
and Broadbent (1986) found that suicidal depressed participants showed a
latency bias (being slower to respond with a specific event to positive
cues), even following a prompt. Some nondepressed control participants
gave an overgeneral memory as their first response but were able to access
a specific memory after prompting in around half the time that it took
suicidal patients after similar prompting (10.8 s vs. 19.1 s). This suggests
that positive retrieval for such patients is more difficult at each stage of the
retrieval process.
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ability of retrieving a second intermediate description following
retrieval of a first intermediate description, relative to matched
nondepressed controls (Barnhofer, Jong-Meyer, Kleinpass, & Ni-
kesch, 2002). The proposal, therefore, is that for depressed indi-
viduals, accessible self-related conceptual knowledge is more
likely to form the basis of responses to memory cues. Instead of
continuing to search for appropriate sensory–perceptual details,
depressed individuals are more likely to mistakenly retrieve self-
related conceptual knowledge (which is highly accessible; Conway
& Bekerian, 1987) as a memory response on the task, leading to an
increased proportion of categorical responses associated with de-
pression.
Capture errors are particularly likely to occur in those individ-
uals who are prone to rumination, which is linguistic in nature.
Experimental evidence for a link between overgeneral memory
and rumination comes from a series of studies by Watkins and
Teasdale (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins et al., 2000).
In these experiments, ruminative thinking was either experimen-
tally exacerbated or reduced, using standard manipulations (Ly-
ubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). The rumination manipula-
tion involved both abstract, analytical thinking about causes,
meanings, and implications and increased self-focused attention
(e.g., “Think about why you feel the way you do”). The distraction
manipulation increased concrete sensory–perceptual processing by
asking participants to focus on non-self-focused images (e.g.,
“Think about the face of the Mona Lisa,” “a raindrop falling down
a window pane”). Results in depressed patients showed that mem-
ory was significantly more specific following distraction than
following rumination.
In two further experiments, the authors examined whether it was
the elevated abstract, analytical processing component or the ele-
vated self-focus component of rumination that maintained over-
generality in memory. In a study with individuals with major
depression, Watkins and Teasdale (2001) compared several differ-
ent types of induction: abstract (ruminative) self-focus (e.g.,
“Think about why you feel the way you do”), nonabstract (expe-
riential) self-focus (e.g., “Focus your attention on your experience
of the way you feel inside”), abstract non-self-focus (e.g., philo-
sophical items like “Think about what equality means”), and
nonabstract non-self-focus (e.g., “Think about a raindrop falling
down a window pane”). They found that degree of self-focus did
not affect specificity of memory recall (but did influence degree of
depressed mood), whereas degree of abstract–analytical thinking
did influence memory specificity (but not mood), with the two
more sensory–perceptual conditions decreasing overgenerality in a
subsequent cue-word AMT. This was the first study to suggest that
overgenerality is related to an abstract–analytical style of thinking
and that it is reduced by switching attentional focus to more
sensory–perceptual experience. The effect of degree of abstract
thinking on specificity of memory was replicated and extended in
a second study, which used experiential and analytical inductions
that focused on identical self-related content and differed only in
the instructions about how to process this content (e.g., for ana-
lytical, “Think about the causes, meanings, and consequences of
. . . ”; for experiential, “Focus your attention on your experience of
. . . ”; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Thus, it appears, at least for
depressed patients, that more abstract–analytical thinking increases
the likelihood of overgenerality of memory.
In this section we have discussed different routes to capture errors
during autobiographical memory retrieval. Can the capture phenom-
enon be more closely defined? If capture by self-related information
does operate in memory retrieval, we should predict that the more any
cue used in an autobiographical memory task maps onto abstract
self-related concerns, the more the cue will tend to elicit an overgen-
eral response. A recently completed study on previously depressed
people in our lab confirms this prediction (Crane, Barnhofer, &
Williams, in press). We assessed self-guides (characteristics that the
person sees as an “ideal” or “ought” or “feared” aspect of themselves;
Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999) 1 week before autobiographical
memory was measured and found that the greater the overlap between
memory cues and their own idiosyncratic self-guides, the more over-
general participants were in their responses to those cues. Two other
studies are also consistent with the relation between overgenerality
and self-relevance. First, Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, and
Williams (in press) showed that the more that patients with a history
of depression (Study 1) and personality disorder (Study 2) endorsed
constructs assessed by questionnaire measures of dysfunctional atti-
tudes and beliefs, the greater was the overgenerality of responses to
cues in the AMT that matched those constructs. Second, Barnard,
Watkins, and Ramponi (2006) showed that inducing normal partici-
pants to repeatedly return to the same higher order theme during a
category generation task increased overgeneral memory, relative to
inducing category generation that shifts across themes, but that this
effect occurred only for self-related themes. Thus, one aspect of
rumination, perseveration on a theme, can induce overgeneral mem-
ory, but only when it is self-related.
Overgeneral Memory as a Consequence of Reduced
Executive Resources
We turn now to the third mechanism that may contribute to
overgeneral memory alongside functional avoidance and capture/
rumination: reduced executive resources. Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce’s (2000) model assumes that generative retrieval (as with
all effortful cognitive tasks) requires the use of limited executive
resources. The model suggests that capacity deficits may affect
several stages of generative retrieval, including the definition and
holding in working memory of a retrieval model, the control
processes that inhibit irrelevant autobiographical knowledge dur-
ing the search (thus avoiding capture errors, addressed in the
previous section), and the holding in working memory of a final
search result, all of which are thought to rely strongly on executive
processing.
This analysis of the potential impact of reduced executive ca-
pacity on generative retrieval in Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s
(2000) model echoes the sorts of arguments proposed in cognitive
resource models of depression. Ellis (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988), in his resource allocation model of cognitive processing in
depression, proposed that the profile of cognitive performance in
depressed individuals could be broadly explained by the notion of
reduced executive resources.
Hertel (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990) expanded on this resource
allocation model view and proposed that depressed individuals
lacked initiative when performing cognitive tasks, such that per-
formance deficits could be overcome by providing the depressed
individuals with information about the optimal way to complete a
given task. Generative retrieval of autobiographical memories
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establishment of intermediate search descriptions to appropriately
map the memory space to be searched. Lack of cognitive initiative
is therefore likely to impede this process. Finally, Zacks and
Hasher (1994) proposed that depressed individuals have difficul-
ties inhibiting interfering cognitive material when seeking to per-
form cognitive tasks. With the Conway and Pleydell-Pearce frame-
work, it is easy to see how this would lead to vulnerabilities during
generative retrieval, which requires appropriate inhibition of mne-
monic material from other stages of the memory hierarchy while a
suitable specific memory is located. Deficits in this ability to
inhibit interfering information may contribute significantly to the
capture errors discussed in the previous section.
The idea that these various aspects of executive processes can
contribute to the emergence of overgeneral retrieval within the
framework of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model is
therefore intuitively appealing, and numerous data are consistent
with this account. Studies of young children show that the ability
to retrieve and report specific memories in a coherent narrative
occurs with the development of supervisory control processes
during the age of 3 to 4 years (Fivush & Nelson, 2004), and
research in elderly groups and groups suffering from brain damage
(Baddeley & Wilson, 1986) has provided evidence that this ability
is impaired by reduced working memory capacity. For example,
Winthorpe and Rabbitt (1988) found that elderly patients who
showed reduced working memory performance in a sentence span
task were more likely to be overgeneral in their recall of events
from their lives. Similar findings have been reported in a study in
normal controls, in which Williams and Dritschel (1992) found a
negative association between performance in a word fluency task
and retrieval of overgeneral memories.
In a related vein, data from studies by Roberts and colleagues
showed that in dysphoric participants, overgeneral memories were
produced more often during the latter half of the test administra-
tion, thus suggesting that these errors may in part be related to
difficulties in keeping in mind a retrieval model in the face of
increasing fatigue with associated diminution of executive re-
sources (Roberts & Carlos, 2006). Ramponi et al. (2004) found
that greater overgenerality in autobiographical recall was shown
by participants who showed reduced “remember” recognition re-
sponses in a remember–know memory paradigm but that overgen-
erality did not correlate with “know” recognition responses.
Given that generative retrieval of autobiographical memories
relies heavily on effortful processes, these results seem unsurpris-
ing. However, not all of the data are so clear cut. Two early studies
that used tasks to control for executive capacity differences did not
find significant effects on overgenerality. Williams and Broadbent
(1986) gave two control semantic memory tests to their suicidal
and control patients to check whether any deficit in autobiograph-
ical memory might be accounted for by general cognitive deficits.
The first was a semantic fluency task in which participants gen-
erated as many instances (in 1 min each) of the categories vege-
tables and boy’s names as they could. In the second task (later
published as the Speed and Capacity of Language Processing Test;
Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992), the time taken by
participants to answer (true or false) to a series of 50 “silly
sentences” was assessed (e.g., “Pork chops are meat,” “Doctors are
always sold in pairs”). The results showed that overgeneral mem-
ory was not simply due to an overall general deficit in semantic
fluency or processing speed. Similar findings were reported by
Williams and Scott (1988). In a third study, in which processing
capacity was directly manipulated, Goddard, Dritschel, and Burton
(1998) investigated autobiographical memory in normal volunteers
under conditions of a secondary choice reaction-time task and
found that the additional load increased categorical recall, but only
in men and only when the secondary task was more difficult. What
might explain these failures to find associations between executive
processing and overgenerality?
Generative retrieval requires processing capacity for both the set-
ting up of a retrieval model and its comparison with retrieved infor-
mation; it also critically requires the inhibition of irrelevant informa-
tion to protect against interference. Although reductions in processing
capacities may affect all of these subprocesses, failures of inhibitory
control are most pronounced. Evidence for this comes from a series of
studies by Dalgleish et al. (in press). Dalgleish et al. argued that if a
central problem in specific memory retrieval is a failure to inhibit
interfering information leading to capture errors, as proposed by
Hasher and Zacks (1979) and Zacks and Hasher (1994; see Feldman-
Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004, for a discussion), then numbers of
overgeneral memories on the AMT should be most clearly associated
with performance on executive tasks that also provide a measure of
“errors” due to interference from irrelevant information that should
have been inhibited. In a series of studies in dysphoric individuals,
Dalgleish et al. demonstrated that this was indeed the case: Levels of
memory overgenerality correlated highly with levels of task errors on
a range of executive paradigms with little or no relationship to
autobiography, memory, or emotion while, in most cases, being
unrelated to overall performance levels on these tasks. In particular,
they were able to show that overgeneral errors correlated with tasks in
which irrelevant material needed to be inhibited (the Emotional
Stroop Test) and not with a task that merely requires sufficient
executive capacity overall (a test of explicit memory of equivalent
difficulty).
These studies help to pinpoint the subprocesses within genera-
tive memory retrieval that might be most closely implicated in the
phenomenon of overgeneral memory. However, it is important to
note another reason for sometimes finding little association with
executive function: that autobiographical events can also be rec-
ollected spontaneously. Such directly retrieved memories are more
often specific in nature (Berntsen & Hall, 2004). One would
therefore predict that the impact of any reduction in available
executive resources on specific memory retrieval would be re-
duced or even absent in situations where there were significant
levels of direct retrieval of specific memories. There are some data
that support this prediction. Williams et al. (2006, Study 3) re-
quired participants to retrieve autobiographical memories while
performing random button pressing as a secondary task, as gener-
ation of a random pattern has been suggested as a paradigmatic
example of a task requiring high levels of central executive control
(Baddeley, 1996). They found that this task did interfere with
specific memory retrieval, but only when participants were at-
tempting to recall memories to low imageable cues, which are
more likely to require using generative (top-down) retrieval.
Because the impact of executive capacity deficits on specificity
of recollection is likely to be, in part, a function of the balance of
generative versus direct retrieval, future studies examining the
effects of capacity impairments on retrieval will need to take
138 WILLIAMS ET AL.
zzzPsgiolePfrpaccount of the method of retrieval participants are likely to be
using when interpreting their findings.
Executive Resources, Capture/Rumination, and the
Valence Effect
The data suggest that executive resources play an important role
in the generative retrieval of specific autobiographical memories
and that deficient resources reduce the amount of cognitive control
that is possible. We can now see how the two processes we have
outlined, capture/rumination and executive control, contribute to
functional avoidance in accounting for the fact that overgenerality
is as likely to occur for positive as for negative cues. Dysphoric
and depressed people are as likely to have their attention captured
by positive as by negative stimuli so long as the cue maps onto a
“self-guide” (Crane et al., in press; Spinhoven et al., in press). In
particular, rumination is often triggered by a discrepancy between
actuality and a desired state or goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996).
Within this framework, as we have seen, a positive cue word could
signal to a depressed person the absence of a personally meaning-
ful state and, in turn, activate further rumination. That is, if a
depressed person sees the cue happy, it is just as likely to elicit
self-referent ruminative thinking (“Why can’t I handle things bet-
ter?”; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) as is a neg-
ative cue. Reduced executive control implies that an impaired
ability to inhibit prepotent (self-referent, ruminative) responses
will make it even more difficult for the individual to maintain
focus on the goal of retrieving a specific event.
Integrating Across Different Components of Overgeneral
Memory in Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Model
We have seen that Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) theory
of why autobiographical memory may be overgeneral, if confined
to truncated search (dysfacilitation) due to avoidance of unpleasant
ESK, will not explain all of the data. However, by taking account
of other aspects of their model, one develops a more comprehen-
sive account. Thus, categorical memory may represent truncated
hierarchical search, exacerbated by capture by conceptual struc-
tures. These impairments are themselves compounded by reduced
processing resources and by the continuing impact of early trauma
and adversity on the self-memory system. It is now possible to see
how these mechanisms interact to explain their impact on memory
(see Figure 2).
First, overgenerality is most likely to occur when retrieval is
top-down (generative). This is because such retrieval requires the
formation of conceptual intermediate descriptors (similar in form
to overgeneral memories), which facilitates memory search
through the hierarchy. Any factor that truncates or disrupts the
generative search process is therefore likely (in a significant pro-
portion of cases) to lead toward inappropriate overgeneral re-
sponses. Second, generative retrieval involves effortful search that
(a) uses conceptual self-related information (e.g., “What sort of
thing makes me happy?”) and (b) requires the inhibition of irrel-
evant information produced by the search process (“I’ve never
been happy; people keep rejecting me”). Reduced executive ca-
pacity and diminished cognitive control will therefore compound a
tendency to become captured by abstract conceptual self-
representations and will diminish strategic task-oriented process-
ing. Depressed individuals have increased access to conceptual
self-relevant information (negative self-schemas such as “I am
worthless and inadequate”; Segal, Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar,
1996), and rumination leads to chronic activation of such gener-
alized mental representations (“Why do I have problems other
people don’t have?”; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Inhibition of habit-
ual, ruminative responses is even more difficult when there are
highly elaborated conceptual representations of the self that are
Type of  Cue word  Sample responses Representation
Verbal / 
Happy: “My dog” Semantic associate Abstract
Happy: “I used to go for 
walks with my dog” General (categoric) 
memory
Happy: “On my birthday
we went for a walk in the 
Hills”
Specific
memory
Sensory / 
Perceptual
Figure 2. Hierarchical processes in generative retrieval. The figure shows schematically what is assumed to
occur in cue word retrieval. Retrieval starts with elaborating the cue semantically and moving through generating
generic descriptions to more specific mnemonic material. Early in generative retrieval, more verbal–abstract
code is involved, and more sensory–perceptual code is used later in the process.
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memory search process. We have also seen that in addition to the
difficulty in generative retrieval, some individuals (those who have
experienced trauma such as road traffic accidents) are additionally
likely to truncate the search process if episodic knowledge tends to
evoke highly negative affect. In these cases, stopping short of
episodic retrieval is functional (Raes et al., 2003) and is negatively
reinforced by the nonoccurrence of expected aversive conse-
quences. In addition, some trauma gives rise to a large number of
long-lasting intrusions that reduce available resources for autobio-
graphical memory search, thus further compounding the problem.
Each of the components of the CaR-FA-X account has evidence
consistent with it. We have seen that categorical memory appears
to represent truncated hierarchical search due to functional avoid-
ance exacerbated by capture by conceptual structures. These im-
pairments are themselves compounded by reduced processing re-
sources and by the continuing impact of early trauma and adversity
on the self-memory system. However, the processes we have
reviewed rarely occur in isolation from each other. In the next
sections we show how the processes we have described may
combine in clinical groups. In particular, we show that trauma may
affect (a) executive capacity, (b) the probability of capture errors,
and (c) depression.
Trauma and Reduced Executive Capacity
We have so far discussed reductions in executive capacity
predominantly as a function of depressed mood (Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Zacks & Hasher, 1994) or as due to
the performance of secondary tasks (Williams et al., 2006). How-
ever, there are also data indicating impaired cognitive processing
across a number of generic tasks in traumatized populations (e.g.,
Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). This
literature implies that the experience of trauma may also lead to
overgeneral memories indirectly via reduced executive resources.
This is perhaps unsurprising, given that traumatized individuals
report frequent intrusive thoughts, images, nightmares, and flash-
backs regarding their trauma as well as consequent attempts to
prevent these experiences using a range of strategies, such as
avoidance of trauma reminders (see Dalgleish, 2004). Both the
overriding of ongoing processing by trauma-related intrusions and
any effortful attempts to control such experiences are likely to lead
to a diminution of executive resources to apply to other tasks.
Numerous data are consistent with this analysis. In their proto-
typical study of trauma and overgeneral memory, Kuyken and
Brewin (1995) showed that self-reported frequency of intrusions of
abuse correlated with overgenerality of recall on the AMT. This
finding has since been replicated a number of times (as noted
earlier). In summary, a history of trauma may lead to overgener-
ality not only because of passive avoidance of emotion-related
ESK but because intrusion of traumatic information reduces avail-
able executive resources.
Trauma and Capture Errors
We have discussed how overgeneral memories may result from
capture errors (which we have so far associated mostly with
depressive states) and/or from passive avoidance of specific dis-
tressing information. Here we illustrate how the experience of
trauma may lead the individual to become vulnerable to capture
errors in three further ways.
First, the effects of trauma on reducing available executive
resources (discussed above) will mean that it is more difficult to
inhibit interfering cognitive information during the generative re-
trieval process, thus resulting in that information forming the basis
of capture errors. Second, the experience of trauma is itself likely
to lead to relatively accessible negative self-schemas (Dalgleish,
2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Such schemas will also “capture”
cognitive processing during generative retrieval in particular au-
tobiographical domains, leading to overgeneral responses as cap-
ture errors. For example, an individual may react to uncontrollable
persistence of posttraumatic stress symptoms such as intrusions,
flashbacks, and nightmares with a schematic model of the self as
“useless” or “crazy” because of the inability to simply “get over”
the trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Third, trauma itself is associ-
ated with an increased tendency for individuals to ruminate about
the upsetting event, in an attempt to make sense of what happened,
to reconcile an event with their self-concept, or to avoid a recur-
rence of the event. Brief self-report measures of rumination about
an identified traumatic event (e.g., “Do you go over and over what
happened again and again?”) are elevated in patients with PTSD
compared with nonclinical controls (e.g., Spasojevic & Alloy,
2002). Furthermore, rumination several weeks after the trauma
predicts the persistence of PTSD at 6 months (Murray, Ehlers, &
Mayou, 2002), 1 year (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998), and 3-year
follow-up (Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002). In summary, capture
errors may occur whenever information needed for the memory
search matches information that is self-schematic. Whenever in-
dividuals then ruminate about what has happened to them, reduced
capacity/control will reduce the ability to inhibit further task-
irrelevant information.
Trauma and Depression
A final way in which the different processes underlying over-
general memory may combine is that many of the different diag-
noses (see Tables 1 and 2) co-occur. Comorbidity of depressive
states along with diagnoses such as PTSD and acute stress disorder
is very common (Brewin et al., 1996). Further, even in the absence
of a comorbid depressive disorder, significant symptoms of de-
pression are also associated with the experience of trauma (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). These overlaps in symptom-
atology mean that another route to overgenerality of memory in
trauma survivors is via depressed mood, with its consequent ef-
fects on capture errors and executive capacity.
In addition, there is an increasing body of evidence to suggest
that depression is associated with intrusive and avoidance symp-
tomatology regarding prior distressing life events (Dalgleish &
Power, 2004), with studies revealing few differences between
clinically depressed individuals and those with PTSD in terms of
the nature of these symptoms (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998). This
suggests that overgeneral memory may result from the fact that in
individuals with depression, executive resources are tied up in
dealing with intrusive memories of past distressing experiences
and their implications. Consistent with this, our review has shown
that overgeneral memory is not found in anxiety disorders (apart
from PTSD). Anxious patients are, in general, concerned with
possible future threats, most often physical harm to self or others
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than with self-referential implications of their past.
In summary, comorbidity between different diagnoses, as well
as overlap in psychopathology across diagnoses, means that a
one-to-one link between different types of mental disorder (e.g.,
major depression or PTSD) and different types of memory impair-
ment is unlikely.
CaR-FA-X: Consequences for Psychological Functioning
In the light of these overlaps both in clinical phenomenology
and in underlying mechanisms, we suggest that all three mecha-
nisms are likely to contribute both to overgenerality in autobio-
graphical memory and, independently, to those aspects of cogni-
tive functioning that have been found to be affected by such
overgenerality (problem solving, imagining the future, and persis-
tence of emotional disturbance; see Figure 3). However, this raises
the question of whether overgenerality in memory is part of the
causal sequence in bringing about such consequences, as we have
assumed, or is a mere epiphenomenon.
Problem Solving
We have seen that, consistent with the idea that accessing episodic
detail of prior experiences may be crucial in generating and evaluating
current problem-solving strategies, many studies have found that low
specificity of memory is associated with impairment in social problem
solving. This occurs in depressed (Goddard et al., 1996, 1997; Raes,
Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere, et al., 2005), suicidal (Evans et al.,
1992; Pollock & Williams, 2001; Sidley, Whitaker, Calam, & Wells,
1997), and currently euthymic bipolar patients (Scott et al., 2000).
These studies assessed interpersonal problem-solving ability using the
Means–Ends Problem Solving Test (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975),
in which participants are presented with short vignettes including the
beginning and ending of a problem situation (e.g., being avoided by
friends and being liked by them again) and asked to describe the most
effective way to solve the problem.
8 Responses are usually rated for
the number of means reported (i.e., the number of single instrumental
steps toward the goal), as well as for overall effectiveness. The above
studies have found significant associations between memory speci-
ficity and both of these measures.
However, because these studies are correlational, it remains
possible that both specificity of autobiographical memories and
quality of problem-solving performance might be determined by
third factors. For example, Watkins and Baracaia (2002) have
found that rumination impairs problem solving in depression, and
so the apparent effect of overgeneral memory on problem solving
may be mediated by rumination. Two types of evidence can be
sought to check the causal relevance of overgeneral memory. The
first involves using regression methods in which both overgeneral
memory and other possible mediators are examined for their
ability to uniquely predict problem-solving impairments. Raes,
Hermans, Williams, and Eelen (2005) used such methods in a
sample of depressed patients, examining both memory and rumi-
nation, and found that overgeneral memory accounted for the
relation between rumination and problem solving.
The second strategy for examining the causal status of memory
specificity is to experimentally manipulate retrieval style in the
laboratory. Williams et al. (2006, Studies 4 and 5) examined
nondepressed undergraduates in which specific and categorical
retrieval styles had been induced experimentally. In one study this
was done by explicitly instructing participants to retrieve specific
events or categorical events; in the second study it was accom-
plished by using cue words that were either low imageable (known
to elicit overgeneral memories; Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999) or
high imageable (known to elicit specific memories). After the
8 One limitation of this methodology for examining problem solving is that
it depends on participants’ ability to report how they would solve problems,
rather than observing what they would actually do. This raises questions about
ecological validity, as well as raising a possible confound concerning im-
proved specificity being associated with better ability to report what one would
do. The relationship of memory specificity and real-world problem solving
remains to be examined. Nonetheless, the MEPS is a well-established measure
of social problem solving that reliably discriminates between groups that have
been determined to differ in actual real-life problem solving (e.g., depressed
patients vs. controls; Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992).
Capture & 
rumination
Consequences
Executive
capacity
and control 
Nonspecific
autobiographical
memory
e.g. Impaired
problem solving 
Functional
avoidance
Figure 3. The CaR-FA-X model: Three processes contributing to overgeneral memory—capture and rumi-
nation (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), and impaired executive capacity and control (X)—can each have
effects on cognition and behavior (e.g., problem solving), either independently or through their individual or
combined effect on autobiographical memory.
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Results showed that induction of overgeneral memory in the first
phase of the experiment significantly reduced the level of problem-
solving performance in the test phase. These findings do not
exclude the critical importance of other processes, such as rumi-
nation, but they do suggest that lack of specificity in memory,
however it comes about, can play a causal role in reducing
problem-solving capacity.
Ability to Imagine Future Events
Williams et al. (1996) found that suicidal patients were gener-
ally poorer than controls at generating specific events that might
happen to them in the future, and that this difficulty was correlated
with overgenerality in memory. To examine direction of causation,
they followed up their finding with two studies in which specific
and categorical retrieval styles were experimentally induced (using
both the instruction and imageability memory induction methods
referred to earlier). Results showed that participants who were
induced to be categorical in their retrieval for past events in the
study phase of the experiment generated less specific future events
during the test phase. Participants who were induced to be specific
in their memory in the study phase produced more specific future
events in the test phase. These data show that overgeneral memory
can have a causal link to the ease with which a person generates
specific future events. This is clearly important, as the ability to
anticipate potential impending events and experiences is critical
for the day-to-day planning of activities (Ajzen, 1998).
Overgenerality and the Development and Course of
Affective Symptoms
Several prospective studies have examined whether overgeneral
memory predicts how long an episode of depression or a posttrau-
matic stress reaction will persist (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Dal-
gleish et al., 2001; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Harvey et al., 1998;
Mackinger et al., 2003; Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000;
Mackinger, Pachinger, et al., 2000; Peeters et al., 2002). However,
none of these studies assessed other likely mediators of the effect
of overgenerality on the persistence of emotional disturbance, and
so we cannot be sure from these studies alone that other factors
(such as rumination) do not play a central role.
An alternative approach is to see whether modifying the ten-
dency to be overgeneral reduces the persistence of emotional
disorder. Serrano, Latorre, Gatz, and Rodriguez (2004) examined
the impact of increasing the specificity of positive memories over
a 4-week intervention in elderly depressed patients. The results
showed that (a) the treatment significantly reduced overgenerality
(particularly in response to neutral cues), (b) it significantly re-
duced hopelessness and depression (compared with a no-treatment
control), and (c) the effect on mood was mediated by the increased
specificity of memory. Taken together, these studies provide rel-
atively strong evidence that overgeneral memory, along with other
variables, is an important causal factor in maintaining depression
and that modifying it may have beneficial consequences.
Future Research on Overgenerality and the
CaR-FA-X Model
The account that emerges from examining overgenerality in
autobiographical memory in the light of Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce’s (2000) model suggests a number of methodological issues
to be addressed and hypotheses to be tested in further experiments.
There are three streams of further work that are suggested by this
review. The first stream is research that can address the method-
ological limitations that have been identified in relation to the
assessment of memory; the second stream addresses etiological
questions; the third stream examines new predictions arising from
CaR-FA-X.
Methodological Issues
Addressing the overdependence on a single paradigm. We
have seen that most studies use the cue word technique, and many
use the same subset of words. Future studies need to diversify in
the methodology used to assess overgenerality, using vignettes,
pictures, and diaries to complement existing methods. In particu-
lar, research might seek ways to examine involuntary as well as
voluntary processes in autobiographical recall as, for example,
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2005) have begun to do. This would
allow greater specification of the contexts in which we expect
overgenerality to occur. For example, the processes described in
the CaR-FA-X model, involving only top-down retrieval pro-
cesses, would have little impact on involuntary memory, and so the
model would predict no overgenerality in such memory responses,
even in depressed patients.
Addressing the breadth of memory assessed. Most studies
have used only an autobiographical memory task, in the absence of
other tests of memory. This is understandable in clinical studies
where the amount of time available for testing is limited, but future
studies should increase the range of alternative memory measures
used to see whether nonspecificity of memory is uniquely predic-
tive of the dependent variable of interest. In particular, memory
and other cognitive tests should be chosen to test specific hypoth-
eses, for example, concerning the particular aspect of memory that
might explain overgenerality (e.g., the assessment of source mem-
ory: Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere, et al., 2006; or
remember–know recognition tests: Ramponi et al., 2004). If future
research were to use more specific, hypothesis-driven tests of
memory functioning, it would make it possible to examine the
association between different subcomponents of memory and other
psychological variables. For example, no study has yet examined
the relation between specificity of autobiographical memory,
source memory, and individual difference in the detail with which
people describe a visual scene. It is possible that some individuals
are prone to describe only the gist of a scene and that this tendency
pervades a number of aspects of their memory encoding and
retrieval, which would then affect source memory, remember
versus know judgments, and autobiographical memory specificity.
The questions such a study would ask are these: Would the online
description of a complex visual scene be more overgeneral in such
patients? Would it vary depending on the affective valence of the
material? Would it be more overgeneral if a patient had less
executive capacity or was performing a secondary task?
Etiology
The second stream of future research would address the meth-
odological challenges involved in addressing the etiological ques-
tions—for example, to what extent depression, trauma, or both are
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al., 2006). We have seen that even those prospective studies that
have shown overgenerality assessed prior to or shortly after a
trauma to predict the later time course of emotional disturbance are
unable to tell us whether this “preexisting” overgenerality was
caused by an even earlier period of depression, trauma, or adver-
sity. Nor do they generally assess a range of other possible medi-
ators of later disorder (e.g., rumination or executive functioning)
sufficient to check whether overgenerality uniquely predicts future
course. Future studies should address both of these caveats by
careful assessment of the history of depression, trauma, and ad-
versity and/or by the deliberate recruitment of groups of partici-
pants with or without such a prior history. The range of variables
assessed should include alternative possible mediators of the pre-
dicted effects, taking account of possible multicollinearity in the
data.
Predictions From CaR-FA-X
The third stream of future research is to test new predictions
arising from the CaR-FA-X model. A number of predictions might
be tested: (a) that AMT cues selected to map onto an individual’s
core concerns or dysfunctional schema are more likely to elicit
overgeneral memories in traumatized populations via capture er-
rors similar to the effects seen in those with prior depression
(Crane et al., in press; Spinhoven et al., in press); (b) that the effect
of cue word type will be moderated by availability of executive
resources (i.e., personally relevant cues are more likely to lead to
overgeneral memory under conditions of cognitive load); (c) that
individual differences in executive capacity, independent of psy-
chopathology, are likely to relate to degree of overgeneral mem-
ory; (d) that overgeneral memory would be reduced or normalized
in depressed individuals by providing them with a “search blue-
print” for generative retrieval (e.g., first identify an appropriate
lifetime period; then, within that period, identify a particular
category of experiences; and then use that to locate ESK), in ways
analogous to Hertel’s approach with other cognitive tasks (e.g.,
Hertel & Hardin, 1990; cf. Hertel, 2004); (e) that manipulating cue
word content on the AMT to increase the amount of direct retrieval
should interact with the effects of executive resources such that
differences in available resources become increasingly irrelevant
with greater levels of direct retrieval; or (f) that overgeneral
memory should shift in response to interventions that reduce the
accessibility of negative self-schemas, break ruminative process-
ing cycles, and/or train individuals in executive control of cogni-
tive processing.
Concluding Remarks
The foregoing review has suggested that individuals with de-
pression and PTSD retrieve overgeneral memories when attempt-
ing to retrieve memories of specific events. This phenomenon is a
reliable feature of these diagnostic groups and can be found in
other (though not all) emotional disorders. The phenomenon of
overgeneral memory ranks alongside other memory deficits known
for many years to be associated with depression but goes beyond
these in several ways.
First, overgeneral memory is a hitherto unrecognized conse-
quence of trauma and adversity, even in the absence of depression.
The significance of this is that negative experiences or trauma in
the past can have effects on the retrieval of events that have
nothing to do with the trauma itself, owing to a general tendency
to truncate memory search. We have seen that these effects can be
reversed given certain retrieval conditions and therefore cannot be
explained in terms of permanent damage to the processes under-
lying encoding. Given that generic retrieval is a normal part of
development, and its retention as one possible mode of retrieval is
required as part of normal memory function (e.g., as an interme-
diate stage in the recollection of specific episodes and as the target
of retrieval for scriptlike situations), it is more likely that individ-
uals discover that overgeneral memory is adaptive in gating out
unwanted affect. Such functional avoidance is central to under-
standing the mechanisms underlying overgenerality in memory.
Second, however, we have seen that a functional avoidance
theory is not sufficient to explain all of the data. We have sug-
gested that the memory impairment may also result from capture
and rumination. Overgeneral memory can be seen as a type of
capture error arising because of the activation, by the intermediate
descriptions that are required for voluntary retrieval, of task-
irrelevant material in the self-memory system. Patients with de-
pression and PTSD are particularly vulnerable to this interruption
of on-task processing owing to a combination of the presence of
salient (and more distracting) self-referent information, on the one
hand, and a tendency to ruminate, on the other.
Third, each of these two factors, avoidance and capture/
rumination, interacts with impairment in a third major mechanism
underlying memory retrieval: executive control. Reduced execu-
tive control results in a failure to inhibit competing information.
The result is a greater likelihood of retrieval being “hijacked” by
task-irrelevant material.
Fourth, in whomever it is found, overgeneral memory is asso-
ciated with, and has been found in some cases to have a direct
causal relation to, important “downstream” consequences. The
research shows that overgeneral memory is an important factor in
affecting a person’s problem-solving ability and his or her ability
to generate specific images of the future. It predicts the course of
emotional disorders, being associated with poorer outcome in
depression, PTSD, and a number of other conditions. But it affects
not only how effectively people cope with serious emotional
disturbance but also how they regulate their emotions in the face of
more normal life events, such as the birth of a child (Mackinger,
Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000).
We have seen that there are a number of methodological issues
that limit the conclusions that can be made from many of the
studies taken individually. But across the studies as a whole, a
consistent picture emerges: that the way one remembers one’s past
is as important as what is remembered; that the specificity of
memory can be affected by and can affect a number of psycho-
logical variables; that it is part of the causal sequence in facilitating
or impairing important aspects of psychological functioning such
as problem solving and one’s ability to imagine the future; that it
can be modified by treatment; and that, when it is modified, it
reduces depression and hopelessness.
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